426. 2024: The Year of Reckoning in the Venture Markets, The Future of Venture Debt, and Why the Venture Cycle is Unique (David Spreng)

426. 2024: The Year of Reckoning in the Venture Markets, The Future of Venture Debt, and Why the Venture Cycle is Unique (David Spreng)

David Spreng of Runway Growth Capital joins Nate to discuss 2024: The Year of Reckoning in the Venture Markets, The Future of Venture Debt, and Why the Venture Cycle is Unique. In this episode we cover:

  • Venture Capital, Technology Investments, and Late-Stage Funding
  • Differentiating Venture Debt Providers and Red Flags to Watch Out For
  • Venture Capital Quality, Liquidity Options, and Restructuring
  • Investing During Market Cycle Peak
  • Venture Debt Market Evolution and Underwriting Model

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Transcribed with AI:

Our guest today is David Spreng, the founder and CEO of Runway Growth Capital, a firm specializing in venture debt. David has a unique background that spans both credit and equity. Before founding Runway Growth, David spent over 30 years as a venture capitalist. He has invested in 18 companies that went on to IPO and has been featured on the Midas List four times. David, welcome to the show
Thank you. Great to be with you. Yeah. So first,
maybe can you give us your background and your path to founding runway growth?
Yeah, of course. So My professional background started on Wall Street, where my my first job was at Salomon Brothers in New York, same time that Michael Lewis was there and was having an experience that propelled him to, to write liars, poker, my, my experience was not nearly as exciting or as rewarding. But I did learn a lot, I found that Wall Street wasn’t really for me. And I wanted to do something a little more interesting. And so I left New York, I started my own company, which I then pretty quickly sold, and wanted to get back into the investment business. And was fortunate enough to join up with a asset management firm back in my hometown of Minneapolis, that was owned by Lloyds Bank in the UK. And at a really young age, I found myself with the job of head of strategy for all the asset management businesses that were owned by Lloyds. And so that was really exciting, really fun. And a great learning experience, my boss at the time, was wise enough and kind enough and thoughtful enough to tap me on the shoulder and say, Hey, if you think you want to someday run an asset management business, which was my goal, that you need to run money, you can’t just be a strategy guy. And so he said, find something that you want to do. And, and we’ll, we’ll get it going for you. It kind of gave me carte blanche to figure out what I wanted to do. And what I really was focused on was finding something nobody else was doing. So I could make it my own. And it turned out venture capital was, was an open field at at that firm. And so I started a venture business for them. And my first investment in 1989 failed. And my second investment was enormously profitable. And so I was able to leverage that into a whole new fund and, and, and venture capital business that I also convinced them needed to be completely autonomous. And the convincing wasn’t hard, because you probably know, banks are highly regulated and, and venture capital businesses difficult for them to be in unless it’s structured just right. So we had our own floor, we had our own investment committee, they did really nothing to manage the business, and including not raising any money, which wasn’t helpful. So I had to do all that on my own.
And what was the first big hit? If you don’t mind me asking? Well, the
first big hit is a company that’s now gone, but it was called demark. And it was a Believe it or not, this shows you how long ago it was. It was a catalogue company. I mean, they would send literally millions of direct mail catalogues, and they had technology and smart buyers and smart marketing people that enabled them to grow really rapidly and get to be big and profitable, and eventually public. And so that that that enabled us to have have a really good return. But after after that, I pretty much focused on technology, particularly communications technology and networking, particularly fibre optic communication and wireless communication. And and that’s really the kind of mega trend that we rode for a decade or more. But after several years under the Lloyd’s banner, I bought the business from them moved from Minneapolis to Silicon Valley, and continue to grow that that firm, which we were very lucky we were one of the top communication investors throughout the night. Ladies, and that was the hot topic, the hot hot. I mean, that was the AI of the day, you know, people thought the internet was growing, doubling every 100 days, and that we needed much more infrastructure in order to handle that traffic. And so telecommunication companies and new startup communication service providers, we’re investing billions and billions of dollars in networking equipment and fibre optic cables. And like I said, wireless networking and all of that. And so we were really big investors vertically, all the way from components through to systems to software, and even to some service providers. And that was just an absolutely fantastic journey and a wave to ride it until it wasn’t and and that all kind of crashed in I guess, for me, the date that I remember the most is Thanksgiving of 2001. Where it was, it was pretty clear that that that wave was was crashing, and you wouldn’t be surfing it for much longer, and that we had to figure out something else to do. And so from from there continue to nurture that and our LPS were kind enough to continue to give us more money. And we were able to, you know, get a good result out of even some some difficult funds by around 2010. My partners and I kind of came to the conclusion that this is just getting really, really too difficult to compete with Sequoia and benchmark and Greylock and Kleiner Perkins, and new people on the block like Andreessen Horowitz, and Union Square, and Foundry. And so we we wanted to find something that we could do that would be more impactful, more interesting, and allow us to be, you know, the real leader, and not just one of 2000 venture firms. And so we started making loans to private companies as an alternative to equity. So I always say in 2010, is when I stopped being a venture equity person, and started being a venture debt or growth lender. And so that’s when we started decathlon Capital Management, which is today, I believe, the largest revenue based loan provider in the country. And a few years later, my my venture capital friends, were telling me, you know, hey, our companies are staying private longer than they ever have. They’re often even out living the life of our venture funds, and our ability to provide them with capital. And so we’re really interested in alternative sources of late stage money to, especially if it’s non dilutive. And so venture debt is something that that we’re really embracing more than we ever have in the past. And hey, David, with your background and relationships, as a VC, and your experience with Decathlon, you should get into this business and find a way to help provide us with late stage capital in the form of debt. And I spent a little bit of time researching it and looking at the incumbents, and at the time, it was like Hercules and triple point and a few others and decided, You know what, this is a really good idea. So in 2015, launched runway brought some people in who are highly complementary and you know, that old saying about the boss’s most important job is to hire people smarter than me. Well, that’s what I set out to do. For me, it wasn’t hard, but I was able to get some really great people and in 2016, we raise the fund with that anchor, kind of strategic commitment from Oaktree Capital Management in LA. And, and the rest is kind of history. So, that’s that’s kind of me in a nutshell. And the reason that I really wanted to start this business was to capitalise on the opportunity that we just talked about and that is late stage companies needing non dilutive capital venture debt before that was really known as an early stage phenomenon, where the cheque sizes were quite small, and the underwriting wasn’t very professional. It was really just based on who the sponsors are like okay, if benchmarks in this thing, we’ll give them a loan because we know they can keep raising money, and I wanted to do real underwriting on real calm buddies. And that’s what we’ve done. And then I also wanted to change the elements of competition from terms and conditions and interest rate to relationship and reputation, because that’s actually really the most important metric that a borrower should look at when making a decision on which lender to choose. It shouldn’t be who has the lowest interest rate is who’s going to be the best partner, and who’s going to be the most predictable and steady hand if we hit a bump in the road, because everybody does,
that. It’s actually an area I wanted to go into first, because as I heard you talking about the competition in venture capital, the equity investments, it strikes me as one that’s easier to differentiate in versus lending. And you were touching on it. But I’d be curious how, like, if you can peel back the onion a bit, and how you guys think about differentiating yourselves. And then oh, the vendor debt market is still nascent overall, but how do you think about maintaining that competitive edge and being the preferred partner founders? Yeah,
great question. And a great observation that it’s easier to do in venture equity than venture debt, you know, venture equity, you’re almost always going to have somebody who takes a board seat, which means you’re going to see him at least once a month and probably talk to him once a week. And you need to have an incredibly strong working, collaborative relationship with your venture equity partner. And they often have, you know, big brands of their own, whether we’re talking about a guy like Vinod Khosla, or Mike Ritz, or whatever, you know, they come with a lot of brand, and a lot of experience and reputation. And that’s, that’s good and bad. If you don’t want to be told what to do, you need to be careful not to pick the wrong person. So in venture debt, it is harder to differentiate yourself. And we do that, like I said, based on relationships and reputations. And in I’m fortunate in that I was in the VC for world for a long time, and was able to sit on boards and get to know and get to be friends with and build relationships of trust with the people that are now running most of the top VC firms. So they know me, they trust me, they know that I won’t panic. And you know, and that’s, that’s proven to be the case. And so when we are competing at runway for a deal, and if by chance, we don’t know the management team, we suggest that they whether they’re going to go with us or somebody else, but they should check references. And don’t talk to the CEOs of the companies where it went well talk to the CEOs of the companies where it got ugly. And that’s where you’ll find, you know, who’s going to be a good partner and who’s not. And that’s really honestly how we differentiate ourselves. And, you know, unfortunately, we’ve had the opportunity to demonstrate that because a couple of our deals have have gone south. And we’ve we’ve been patient and helpful, and I think mature in how we’ve worked collaboratively with the sponsors to find a solution that works not just for us and the equity sponsors, but for the management team. Because if you don’t, let’s say if you forget, or purposely neglect is even worse, to provide incentive for management, you’re gonna end up with nothing. And so that’s something that we’re really thoughtful about.
What are some of the non obvious red flags that a CEO who’s considering multiple venture debt providers should be asking to the lenders like what what are some of the red flags that can be elicited as they’re doing the research as to whether or not this firm is going to be a good partner? Well,
the most obvious one is if they have foreclosed on a lot of companies, I think any any lender that has been around a long time, it’s inevitable. It’s it’s often a part of the of the playbook. If let’s just say the equity sponsors just walk away. And of course, the management team doesn’t have the money probably that’s needed to carry on. And so you know, there are situations where you you have to foreclose, just because it’s a part of the legal process, but there are other lenders that are are very quick to use that tool And I think that would be a very big red flag. The most obvious one. Yeah.
You It’s rare for us to have someone on the show that has both venture debt experience and venture equity experience. Yeah. I said it with almost a degree of pause, which leaving optionality open in case there was, but I can’t think of anyone either. I am curious, though, because you’ve been around venture capital so long, like, as you’ve seen venture mature from a cottage industry to a mainstream asset class, have your thoughts on the quality of the asset class involved along with it? So
it’s a really great question. And I had mixed feelings. I think if I were a very large institutional investor running a pension fund, or a foundation or endowment, I would definitely participate. It’s just really hard to predict how how it’s going to evolve and which one of the ploy players will deliver the best returns over the next decade, let’s say, and, and I think it’s a super important asset class, important, not just from an investor’s point of view, but really important, from the point of view of our country, that it plays such an important role in allowing innovation to get from a lab or garage, or just an idea to be a product or a service that’s improving people’s lives. And if we were to ever lose the venture capital industry, it would be a massive loss. And you’re right, I’ve been doing this a very long time. And I don’t know more than a decade, well, more than a decade ago, I was invited to advise the European Union, on how to stimulate a venture capital industry, and then as a part of the of World Economic Forum project, did the same thing in China. And, you know, it, it’s, it’s, it’s a challenge, because it’s not just Europe and China, you know, it’s other parts of the US, like, Des Moines, Iowa would love to be Silicon Valley. It’s just not that easy. And so we’re super fortunate that we have it, we’re super fortunate that Silicon Valley is now more of an idea than a specific geography. And that that New York and Boston and Austin and other places are extremely vibrant and robust innovation economies. So I think you asked the question from like an investor’s point of view, I think it will continue to evolve and change. But I believe right now, of all the major asset classes, over the last, whatever timeframe, you pick, maybe not a year or two, but 510 1520 years, it’s the highest performing asset class. And the scale of it is so much larger than even when I was doing it, which, you know, like I said, ended in 2010, so almost 15 years ago, but I remember back on the on the board of the NVCA, the National Venture Capital Association, we’re talking about a a market that would kind of find an equilibrium with 15 or 20 billion invested. And by that, I mean, a sufficient number of exits to support 15 or 20 billion of new investment, you know, but two years ago, it was 300 billion. So you think about the exits that are required for that, to actually make money. It’s, it’s massive. So there’s a lot of innovation, it’s constantly changing. And I think we’re gonna continue to see that and it’s, it’s honestly hard to predict some of the innovations, you know, the one that I I see as being pretty obvious and and hope I’m not sure if I should say hopefully, because it might come into our business but is a you know, long dated fund structure, where right now VC funds are mostly 10 years and that’s clearly not enough time. But it is where we lend a lot of money. Our average company is 14 years old. So if you can imagine, you know, let’s say Sequoia, did the series A 14 years ago, you know, that that fund is out of is probably out of capital, and it and and more than eager to find somebody else to fund the company and ideally without dilution. It’s Your
average company is 14 years old. It makes me think about all the early stage investors that don’t have access to liquidity but need access to liquidity to start returning dollars to LPs, as you think about the future and feels that these companies are not going to become public any sooner than they are now. But I think this trend of remaining private will persist. What do you think happens over the next 510 years? In terms of opportunity for private equity, to provide liquidity options for early stage investors? How do you how do you see that gap being filled? is maybe the better question. Yeah,
I think it’s a secondaries. And the amount of money that has flown in the secondaries is enormous. But most of it is aimed at private equity rather than venture capital. And I don’t know if you notice, but Sequoia heritage just created a new firm called Pine Grove. And their focus is on venture secondaries. Because there are so many pension funds, foundations, endowments, family office, institutional investors, that kind of went big into venture and now are overweight, and are also nervous about where those marks are gonna go. And so they’re looking to get out. And I think Sequoia heritage, and Brookfield Who’s the other sponsor, they’re, you know, really think that the time is, is now for that, and I think over the next couple of years, that’s true. And you know, you asked about P E. You know, the, the formerly PE firms that have now become alternative asset, jogger nots, whoever that is Carlyle, KKR, Apollo, Brookfield, this is something they think they’re all going to want to be in. So So I think that is one of the answers, I also think you’re gonna see an enormous amount of restructuring. I don’t know what the numbers but it could be half of the cap tables out there are broken, either because they gave away too much too early coming through an incubator, or an accelerator, or a studio or something like that, or in our world more commonly, because they did an overpriced equity round, and the the, they can’t raise new capital. And so I think 2024 is the year of restructuring. And I hope that more companies get restructured as opposed to fail. But we are seeing a lot more failures. And I think we’ll continue to see that. So I think it’s a combination of those that that hopefully allows us to find an equilibrium, where there is a natural culling of the herd, which is healthy happens at the end of every venture cycle, this one may be more painful, because the numbers are more exaggerated than ever, because we came off a decade of zero interest rates. And so but but I think I think that the the secondary plays is going to play a big, big role in it. Speaking
of cycles, what are some of the leading indicators that we’re hitting the peak of the cycle, like I know, oh, trees, an anchor in your fund. And I recently reading Howard Marks mastering the market cycle. And I was thinking about how this applies to venture because the ventures a lagging industry, that’s one. That’s one interesting aspect here. But hysteria just feels like or the exuberance feels like it’s just kind of high for so long. And I’ve only been in the industry a few years, but you have the benefit of longitudinal views since the mid 90s. Like what have you realise when we’re hitting a peak in the cycle, and it might be time to take chips off the table or react accordingly?
Yeah. Okay. So and you’re right, Howard Marks is all in on sea change. I don’t know if you’ve listened to any of his podcasts or read his his memos. But, you know, he thinks this is one of the biggest inflection points that we’ve seen in financial markets, certainly in our era, and that the economic cycle, the interest rate cycle, are not necessarily matched to the venture cycle. And I would say that not on not not only are we reaching the peak, we passed it, and things that indicate that are the number of companies that are failing, the really significant decline and money that’s being invested. And the and the caution, I guess I would say that most VCs are taking with how they invest and where they invest and You got to kind of put the the user word, the hysteria in AI to the side. But for the most part, VCs are being told by their investors that don’t don’t come asking for more money, we don’t have it. Now, there’s probably a number, I don’t know whether it’s 50 or 100, venture firms that can raise capital in any market whatsoever. And, and some of them can still use the old way of just send an email and say, wire money, and they’ll get it. But that leaves something like 4000 additional venture firms that don’t know where they’re going to get their next fund. And so at their partner meetings, they’re saying, Okay, guys, the new fund that we thought we were going to have in 2024, is probably 2025, or further. So we’ve got to make whatever remaining capital we have now lasts much longer. So what you’re seeing are people doing triage on their portfolios, and actively saying to some of them, we love you, but we have no more money for you. And in fact, I’m kind of too busy right now. So I’m going to actually go off the board. So it’s it, you know, I always call them orphans. But it’s, it’s just like you’re, you’re you’re you’re taking one or two of your kids and throwing in the ocean with a lifejacket and saying good luck. And some of them will be fine, but many of them will not. And the other thing that this is another way it’s manifesting is, you’re seeing venture firms actually go out of business, and you’re seeing venture firms change their strategy. So if your strategy was to be A, B, or C, or D round player, rating, a 20, or $25 million check, you can all of a sudden say, You know what, we’re actually a seed or series A investor, and we only write two to $5 million checks. So it’s a good way to extend your own runway. So those are all the things that you see when the cycle shifted. And we’re seeing them all right now.
What are your thoughts? When you hear venture investors say that price doesn’t matter? Price
doesn’t matter? Yeah. Well, so I think from a statistical point of view, it’s pretty true. I mean, you you know, as well as anybody that, you know, it’s a it’s a power law distribution. World, all of the returns are in just a few deals. And if you’re, if your Series A round, was investment was at a 20 million valuation, or 25, or 50, or even 100, you’re still going to do exceptionally well. I remember back when Jim Brier, at Xcel did Facebook at at 100 million. And a lot of us who weren’t in the deal, didn’t know how much we missed out. But we were making fun of 100 million. And you know how that turned out. So I think there is some statistical merit to the statement, but I’ve never ignored valuation and have never, and never chased it. So and there are even people that is especially an overexuberant market, we’ll say, the more we can invest, the higher the valuation, because they’re really focused on the percent of the company they can own. Because that’s their model is it won’t move the needle for us unless we own 20% At exit, or whatever the number is. And the the the upfront going in valuation is less important. I’m sure somebody’s written a paper on this. I haven’t seen it. But my hunch would be is that that, that that statement is is probably got some truth to it. Yeah.
So what do you see on the horizon for this year? I mean, businessinsider, called this year of reckoning. Do you agree with that? Or are you more bullish given the current date? No,
I definitely think overall, it’s a year of reckoning. And I am really cautious to be painting with too broad of a brush. And I’m really adamant whenever I talk to anybody about venture debt that we make sure we we both are talking the same language where there are at least two distinct and different businesses that is known under the banner of venture debt. And the easiest way to bifurcate is early stage and late stage. And like I said earlier, our our average company is 14 years old. It’s raised over 100 million of venture equity, and is doing more than 50 million in revenue. And I think in the last year, our average is more than like 100 million revenue. So that’s not a startup and the early stage venture debt lending These are much, much smaller loans made to companies that are often pre revenue. And the only real basis for the loan is who is the sponsor, if it’s a good sponsor, and it’s perceived that they will be able to raise subsequent rounds of equity, then it’s that’s it. That’s the underwriting, that’s how you get paid back as future rounds of equity. And when I started runway, whatever, eight years ago, I that was an absolute number one requirement is that we’re not going to lend money based on the expectation that VCs will continue to invest, because they know how it works. And even even when they say they’ll continue to invest. If we go through a period right now, and they have to make these difficult decisions, this particular company may not be one that they want to continue to support. Yeah, that
strikes me as an underwriting model that’s prone to breaking. You know what
I agree, obviously, but it hasn’t really broken. I mean, if you look at like Silicon Valley Bank, or Hercules, or WTI, or people that have been doing mostly early stage for a very long time, their losses are low sub 2%. So it their losses are lower than middle market, leveraged buyout lending. And so each company, yes, may sound pretty risky. But you know, when pooled together, and particularly in a mainly up market, like we’ve had, the losses have been very low.
That’s surprising. I’m surprised to hear that it’s 2%. Sub 2%.
Yep. Well, and and if you look at the late stage, it’s not to toot our horn or pat her back, but ours is under 1%.
Wow. That’s, that’s a very good loss ratio there. How have you seen the venture debt market evolve over the eight, nine years that you’ve been running runway,
so I think the biggest change is one that we drove. And that’s larger checks, to larger, least risky, less risky companies. So we decided that we want to focus on pre profit, that’s still the case. That’s a bright light demarcation line, like banks don’t like pre profit companies, cashflow lenders don’t like pre profit companies. And so we’re, we’re what we do, whether you want to call it adventure lending, or growth, lending is really focused on pre profit. You know, that’s where we’re comfortable, and many other people are not. But the fact that we came out and said, We’re going to look for the least risky, largest, most predictable companies that have the clearest path to profitability, and we’re going to be willing to write bigger checks for them. I think that’s the biggest change. And then, you know, the number of participants has has grown significantly. And along with that, I may, I may, we should back up and say the biggest change is a widespread acceptance, that debt is appropriate, and prudent and wise in pre profit companies. 1520 years ago, I think there was, you know, the conventional wisdom was a company that’s not making money shouldn’t have debt. I think today, people recognise that if you have a company that has sufficient enterprise value, and a sufficiently stable enterprise value, where it’s not subject to just going away, that you can use debt. So
what do you see for the next eight years? Like, where would you place the maturity of the venture debt market today, relative to where you think it’s gonna head?
I think there’s going to be a continuation of the current trend. And, you know, we’re we’re really at a point now, where debt has almost taken the place of an IPO. And, and like you said earlier, you know, we don’t see the IPO window, really opening up anytime soon, if it stays as it is now, where it’s driven by institutional investor and their appetite for risk, absent some government legislation that may open up investing in, you know, in late stage private companies from an equity point of view to retail investors. And there are some discussions that would, would do that. I think that is going to continue to play a bigger and bigger role. we’re even seeing a blending with private equity. When I first started when we said sponsor, we exclusively meant VCs today we mean VC and PE. We do a lot of lending to PE backed companies that are interesting, large, have have very strong and stable enterprise value, but don’t quite meet the specs of their traditional lenders, whether they be banks or cash flow lenders. And so more and more we’re lending to private equity backed companies. And I think you’re gonna see that continue. So I think the current trends will continue. I think you’ll also see Europe, let’s say catch up, because it’s, it’s quite far behind. It’s it’s quite far behind in its in its own venture capital ecosystem. And as you would expect, as a corollary is quite far behind on venture debt. So I see, I think you’ll see Europe catch up a lot. And, and, you know, overall, I think debt will continue to take market share in the let’s just call it the pie of funding pre profit companies, which as of now, is mostly venture equity and venture debt. There certainly are some government programmes and grant programmes and and that kind of stuff, but it’s mostly venture debt and venture equity. And I think venture debt will take a bigger and bigger piece of that pie over the next eight years,
what is something that you know, now being a nine years into starting the firm or, you know, running the firm that you wish you knew when you first founded the firm? Well,
if I could have been more cyfle, enough to see this opportunity in private equity earlier, I think that that would have been beneficial. So that’s a wish for sure. The role of professional placement agents is another thing that I didn’t fully appreciate. And for for somebody who’s, who’s not in the industry every day, you probably aren’t even aware of these names. If I said, like, our mentum, and and credo 180. And didn’t, they probably mean nothing to you. But those are investment banking boutiques that do nothing, but advise issuers, mostly venture backed issuers on raising debt. And so they’re a really important part of our industry. And eight years ago, I didn’t improve appreciate the role that they play. And and it is it is very important. And you some people might say, Yeah, but, you know, why do you want to get involved with a deal that’s just being shown to everybody, we welcome that competition, because we win far more than we lose for the reasons that we talked about earlier. And when you have a professional placement agent, you know, there’s going to be a deal, you know, there’s going to be a professional data room. And you know, there’s going to be somebody at that board meeting, when the decision is made, who’s advising the board on the basis for the decision. And, and, and we know that they tell them for an intro from an interest rate point of view, anything within 200 basis points, look at it the same, it’s not going to move the needle, really focus on who’s the best partner. And luckily, those names that I mentioned, and others that are leaders in this space, have a knock on wood, positive view of of runway as a partner. So we welcome that competition. So that’s another thing that I really wasn’t as aware of. David, if
we can feature anyone on the show, who should we interview and what topic would you like to hear them speak about?
Alright, so the my, my lens is skewed towards venture capital. And I would say on top of that list would be Mike Moritz from Sequoia because he’s always one or two steps ahead of the industry. And I I’d love to hear more about what his plan is for Sequoia heritage. You know, it based on what I read. He’s kind of moved from Sequoia venture capital to Sequoia heritage, the broad based asset management firm, which seems to be doing really, really well. I also think Fred Wilson from Union Square, just because he’s been just amazingly successful as as a seed stage investor, and somebody from Foundry like Brad Feld to hear about how they made that decision to just stop when when they could easily raise another fund at a year with a snap of their fingers. So those would be three that I would love to to Uh, to hear from him and you, you do a really good job of getting super interesting people. So I’ll keep an eye out for one of those three.
Yeah. Well, we’d be lucky to have any one of them. Let me Then last what’s the best ways for listeners to connect with you? And or runway?
Yeah, you just send me an email at d s at runway growth.com.
Awesome. Well, thanks again for coming on the show. I appreciate it. I think as I mentioned, we were talking about earlier, you’re the only one that has venture debt and venture equity experience. So this was a real treat. Well,
it’s been great to talk to you, you your your questions are fantastic. Your show is fantastic. And I’m looking forward to keep in touch. Appreciate it.
All right, that’ll wrap up today’s interview. If you enjoyed the episode or a previous one, let the guests know about it. Share your thoughts on social or shoot them an email, let them know what particularly resonated with you. I can’t tell you how much I appreciate that some of the smartest folks in venture are willing to take the time and share their insights with us. If you feel the same, a compliment goes a long way. Okay, that’s a wrap for today. Until next time, remember to over prepare, choose carefully and invest confidently thanks so much for listening